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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3495 
 ___________ 
 
 DARREN JOHNSON, 




DOCTOR STEMPLER; DOCTOR DENNIS MOYER, COMMISSIONER  
MARTIN HORN; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC.;  
CORRECTIONAL PHYSICIAN  SERVICES, INC 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-00-cv-00711) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Jacob P. Hart (by consent) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2011 
Before:  BARRY, JORDAN AND GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Darren Johnson, a prisoner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from 
an order denying his Motion for Relief from Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).  




 In 1999, while incarcerated at SCI-Graterford, Johnson suffered a knee injury.  He 
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 2000, claiming that he had received inadequate and 
delayed treatment in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, which led to permanent damage.  See Johnson v. Stempler, No. 00-
711, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2005).   
 Among those named in the suit as defendants were Correctional Physician 
Services, Inc. (CPS) and Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS), a subsidiary of American 
Service Group, Inc. (ASG).  CPS is a ―private corporation [that was] contracted to 
provide medical services for inmates at SCI-Graterford,‖ by employing doctors as 
independent contractors for on-site care and by arranging aspects of off-site care when 
necessary.  See Johnson v. Stempler, No. 00-711, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21726, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007).
1
  PHS replaced CPS as the medical contractor for the institution 
pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) executed on March 29, 2000, which 
transferred CPS‘s assets to PHS in exchange for $14,000,000, some of which was to be 
used to compensate CPS‘s two shareholders and some of which was to be reserved for 
CPS‘s creditors.  The two shareholders of CPS were also to take roles as consultants at 
PHS.  Significant to the instant appeal, PHS agreed to assume ―all liabilities arising after 
                                                 
1
 CPS and PHS, despite being private entities, are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 because they exercise powers that were traditionally the prerogative of the 
state, act in close concert with state officials, and are significantly entangled with 
traditional state activities.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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the Closing Date with respect to the provision of services to inmates covered by the PA 
Contract,‖ and explicitly declined to assume ―any liability or obligation of [CPS] 
whatsoever which accrued at any time on or prior to the Closing Date, whether or not 
such liability or obligation arises prior or subsequent to the Closing Date, including . . . 
litigation or claims.‖  APA §§ 3.1, .3.  Following the transfer of assets, it appears that 
CPS was quickly depleted of any remaining funds and ceased to function.
2
  
 On January 18, 2005, the District Court partly granted defendants‘ motion for 
summary judgment, dismissing all claims against PHS but sustaining some claims against 
CPS.  In dismissing the claims against PHS, the District Court reasoned that Johnson‘s 
injury predated PHS‘s assumption of duties at Graterford; as Johnson ―offered no 
evidence to show that PHS was involved with medical care at SCI-Graterford at that 
time, [PHS could] bear no liability for the events giving rise to this suit.‖  Stempler, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765, at *16–17. 
Counsel was then appointed to represent Johnson.  Following a protracted 
discovery battle—which led the District Court to sanction CPS on January 30, 2006—
Johnson belatedly acquired access to the APA.  On March 1, 2006, he filed a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), arguing that the APA demonstrated 
PHS‘s assumption of relevant liabilities from CPS and asking for PHS to be reinstated as 
                                                 
2
 For example, on September 6, 2007, counsel for CPS requested to withdraw, as he 
had been informed by the former president and shareholder of CPS that CPS had ―no 
assets and no ability to pay him for the defense.‖ Mot. of Alan S. Gold, Esq., to 
Withdraw ¶ 6, ECF No. 155.  
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a defendant in the suit.  The District Court denied this motion on October 5, 2006, 
observing that it was untimely filed but also briefly addressing the merits. 
CPS filed a second motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the 
District Court on March 27, 2007.  Johnson secured a default judgment against CPS on 
March 28, 2008, see Order, ECF No. 165, and was awarded $65,000 in damages.
3
  He 
appealed the adverse rulings, and while we affirmed the majority of the District Court‘s 
dispositions, we vacated its denial of Johnson‘s Rule 60(b)(2) motion; as Rule 60(b) 
applies only to final judgments, ―the one-year time limitation imposed by the Rule does 
not apply to situations where the order in question was not properly appealable in the first 
place.‖  Johnson v. Stempler, 373 F. App‘x 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2010).   
On remand, the District Court considered three issues: 1) whether the contractual 
language of the APA suggested an assumption of responsibility for suits arising out of 
pre-agreement conduct; 2) whether the doctrine of de facto merger established PHS as the 
successor in interest to CPS, regardless of the APA; and 3) whether this Court‘s holding 
in Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Services, Inc., 360 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2004), 
which found potential for successor liability in a Title VII claim involving the selfsame 
APA in controversy in the instant suit, would compel a finding of PHS as the successor in 
interest to CPS.  See id. at 179.  The District Court held that 1) the plain language of the 
                                                 
3
 The default judgment stemmed from CPS‘s failure to acquire new counsel after the 
withdrawal of its prior counsel.  CPS and its representatives also failed to participate 
at the hearing to determine appropriate damages.  See 5/28/2008 Tr. 3:10–15, ECF 
No. 177.  
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APA did not support an assumption of liability, 2) no de facto merger existed under either 
Pennsylvania law or federal common law, and 3) Brzozowski was not analogous and did 
not establish successor liability in all situations arising out of this APA.  As ―discovery of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement would not have changed the outcome of trial under Rule 
60,‖ the District Court denied the motion.  Johnson v. Corr. Physician Servs., 725 F. 
Supp. 2d 481, 490–91 (E.D. Pa. 2010).  This appeal followed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
4
 and review the District Court‘s 
denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) motion for abuse of discretion.  Compass Tech. v. 
Tseng Lab., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995).  ―An abuse of discretion may be found 
when the district court‘s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.‖  Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 
333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations, citations omitted). 
III. 
―The general rule of corporate successorship accepted in most states is non-
liability for acquiring corporations . . . [but] [t]he purchaser may be liable where: (1) it 
assumes liability; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4
 Johnson filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion on August 15, 2010; accordingly, 
our jurisdiction was forestalled pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).  See 
Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2008).  The District Court denied 
the motion on August 31, 2010.  The 60(b)(6) motion is not before us, as Johnson has 
not amended his Notice of Appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).   
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transaction is fraudulent and intended to provide an escape from liability; or (4) the 
purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling company.‖  United States v. 
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).  Johnson raises 
options (1), (2), and a variation of (4).   
 
A) Contract Interpretation and Liability under the APA 
Johnson argues that the APA proves that PHS assumed a financial obligation for 
his injury, as the ―liability‖ arising therefrom—which he defines as the legal obligation of 
an actual judgment—did not materialize until the default judgment was entered against 
CPS, long after the execution of the APA.
5
  PHS counters that this definition of 
―liability‖ is unworkable and was not contemplated by the parties to the agreement.  The 
District Court agreed with PHS, finding Johnson‘s proffered definition of liability 
(derived from its Black‘s Law Dictionary entry) to be unduly cumbersome and ultimately 
nonsensical in the context of the APA.  Johnson, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 487. Accordingly, 
―PHS [was] not liable regarding the medical care offered to Johnson because it occurred 
before the closing date.‖ Id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5
 Johnson also argues that, if liability means ―the basis of the claim,‖ he should still 
prevail, as his § 1983 suit did not mature until after he had exhausted his 
administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.  To the extent that this alternative 
argument is properly before us, it is meritless, as it is based on a faulty premise.  See, 
e.g., Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2005) (tolling statute of 
limitations during exhaustion of administrative remedies); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 
F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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The ―paramount goal of contract interpretation [in Pennsylvania] is to determine 
the intent of the parties.‖  NOVA Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., 579 F.3d 319, 323 
(3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).  There is a strong argument to be made that the parties 
did not wish to subject PHS to suit for violations that occurred before it acquired CPS‘s 
assets.  For example, the language of section 3.1 of the APA takes pains to distinguish 
liabilities occurring before and after the closing date from liabilities derived from pre-
closing-date responsibilities that become effective only after the closing date.  Section 
3.1(ii) provides for the assumption of ―all accrued current liabilities of [CPS] as of the 
Closing Date with respect to the Business with respect to payroll and accrued vacation 
pay to the extent attributable to any payroll period ending after the Closing Date that 
relates to the operation of the Business prior to and after the Closing Date.‖  By contrast, 
section 3.1(iii), relied upon by Johnson, only mentions ―liabilities arising after the 
Closing Date with respect to the provision of services to inmates covered by the PA 
Contract.‖     
We are not unsympathetic to Johnson‘s argument, especially given the convoluted 
verbiage of the APA, but our standard of review is not de novo, and Johnson has not 
shown why the District Court‘s conclusion is either legally erroneous or factually 
unsupportable.  Therefore, we are unable to find that the District Court abused its 
discretion on this ground. 
 




B) De-Facto Merger 
 A de facto merger inquiry ―investigates whether a transaction labeled ‗Asset 
Purchase Agreement‘ in fact constituted a merger – a determination that does not arise 
purely from the agreement itself.‖  Berg Chilling Sys. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 465 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Under the majority standard, elements of a de facto merger include: 1) 
continuity of management, personal, physical location, assets, and general business 
operations; 2) continuity of shareholders; 3) rapid liquidation of the seller corporation and 
cessation of business; and 4) uninterrupted continuation of business and assumption of 
liabilities.
6
  Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305.   
We agree with the District Court that there is no evidence of factors 1 and 2.  The 
two shareholders of CPS, while assuming consultancy positions at PHS, took on no 
equity shares or leadership roles in PHS.
7
  The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding there to be no de facto merger. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 As observed by the District Court, Pennsylvania explicitly requires the existence of 
continuity of ownership in order to consider the de facto merger doctrine, although the 
matter is currently before its Supreme Court.  See Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods. v. 
XLN, Inc., 973 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), allocatur granted, 994 A.2d 
1081 (Pa. 2010).   
 
7
 In fact, it appears that the shareholders started another prison healthcare company in 
the wake of the CPS sale.  See Gary Craig, Lawsuits Entangle Jail-Care Provider, 




C) Brzozowski Liability 
Lastly, Johnson argued that Brzozowski compels a finding of successor liability.  
Brzozowski examined the same APA in the context of a Title VII employment 
discrimination suit, and held ―that the District Court erred in refusing to allow joinder of 
[PHS] as an additional defendant‖ in a suit against CPS.  Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 179.  
We agree with the District Court that Brzozowski was premised on the specific concerns 
raised by employment liability actions, and was indeed based on an analysis of ―factors 
applicable to successor liability in the employment discrimination field.‖  Id. at 179 
(citing Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pennsylvania, 181 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 
1999)) (emphasis added).  It does not command a similar outcome here.   
IV. 
As the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b)(2) 
motion, we will affirm its judgment.  PHS‘s motion for leave to file an amended appellee 
brief is denied as unnecessary. 
